Bullett-riddled


The booking photo says it all

This blog’s newfound buddy, Adam “[Gee, maybe I’m not so] Bulletproof” Reposa, is–unfortunately–back in the news.

Tex Parte Blog just came across the ad mentioned here a few months ago and used quite effectively by the prosecution as an exhibit at Reposa’s trial for demonstrating an alternative hand sign for “contempt.”

Reposa has filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals complaining his 90-day contempt sentence is excessive. In his writ, Reposa alleges that he was denied due process and due course of law when “Judge Davis declined to follow criminal procedure in ascertaining applicant’s guilt” by allowing the state to introduce evidence of extraneous conduct, i.e., the ad mentioned above from something called Whoopsy magazine, which is apparently distributed in some Austin clubs.

Of course it is.

In a letter sent by one of Reposa’s attorneys to the State Bar‘s Advertising Review Committee responding to the committee’s letter that threatened to report Reposa to the State Bar’s grievance committee, Reposa’s counsel justified the ad (presumably with a straight face) by stating:

If one was acquainted with Mr. Reposa when he was 11 years old, then they might connect this parody with him, but otherwise, no casual reader would regard this parody as an advertisement for a specific lawyer.

No, of course not. Except for the fact that the ad repeatedly mentions it references an Austin DWI attorney who has given himself the moniker, “Bulletproof.” It just so happens that there’s only one Austin DWI attorney–or any attorney in the state for that matter–who [in]famously holds himself out with the nickname “Bulletproof.”

Surely no one could connect those disparate dots?

Thx to Tex Parte Blog, Texas Lawyer, and Awesomeness For Awesome’s Sake

Legally sufficient

I just posted a response to a thoughtful comment made regarding my earlier jeremiad aimed at Texas Watch‘s recent report entitled, “In the Shadows: A look Into the Texas Supreme Court’s Overuse of Anonymous Opinions.” Of course, after my recent discourse with someone purporting to be Adam “Bulletproof” Reposa, pretty much anything is–by comparison–civil, restrained, and respectful.

Please permit me to plagiarize myself and reprint some of my response here as I think it bears directly upon the merits–or lack thereof–of the most recent Texas Watch “study.”

[O]ne of the main thrusts of my argument is that the very jurisprudential purpose of a per curiam opinion negates the central tenet of Texas Watch’s argument that per curiams are being inappropriately used to dispose of legally complex cases that should be issued as an authored opinion.

Instead, I posit that the more likely cause of the undisputed rise in per curiam disposition of cases is attributable to the Court’s desire to clear its undenied backlog of cases—of which Texas Watch has previously complained. My point is that it wholly undermines what little credibility may be initially afforded Texas Watch to knock the Court for utilizing the only determinative tool at its disposal to address an urgent problem of which Texas Watch has publicly ridiculed the Court. Texas Watch can’t have it both ways.

To believe otherwise is not just to merely accuse the six Justices who vote to issue a given per curiam opinion of being complicit in flouting the very appellate rules they are charged with drafting, but it is to accuse all nine Justices of intentional malfeasance because every such per curiam opinion is authored en banc. No serious observer or critic of the Court would accuse every single Justice of being either so incompetent or malicious as that. That is why such claims cannot be taken seriously.

However, if your objection is really that I didn’t refute the individual merits of the fourteen cases incorrectly cited by Texas Watch in their report, let me indulge you.

At the outset, however, one should note that the political agenda (as opposed to legal analysis) of Texas Watch is revealed by their “[i]mpact” headings under each case’s discussion in the report. The political impact of any particular decision is, of course, constitutionally beyond the purview of the Court to decide. Indeed, that is why Texas has a legislative branch. But if the legal merits (or lack thereof) of a case demand a certain result, that result can very well have political impacts that are distasteful to the public at large. That is precisely how the system is supposed to work; so that the public can then go to their elected representatives in the Legislature and demand a change in the law to remedy the odious effect. But it is not constitutionally up to Court to masquerade as a super legislature. To assume otherwise is to reveal a basic and fundamental misunderstanding of not only remedial civics but of the constitutional function of the judicial branch.

Now to the cases, none of which are even vaguely legally controversial on their merits.

In In re RLS Legal Solutions, LLC, 221 S.W.3d 629, 630 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam), the Court hinged its holding on its earlier, authored opinion in In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex. 2001). Indeed, that is likely why this case was issued per curiam, because the central legal issue had already been decided by a previous, authored opinion.

In Schaub v. Sanchez, 229 S.W.3d 322, 322 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam), the “only theories under which the patient could recover were dismissed by agreed order in the trial court.” Error was not preserved by agreement of the parties; clearly a case hugely appropriate for per curiam disposition.

In Ed Rachal Found. v. D’Unger, 207 S.W.3d 330, 331 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam), the Court again referred to two earlier, authored opinions that resolved the determinative legal issue on appeal. See Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc.-The Hosp. Co., 967 S.W.2d 400, 401-02 (Tex. 1998 ); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990.

In In re DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 227 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam), the Court reversed a trial court’s discovery order as to one subset of withheld documents. While this opinion was a little more legally complex than those discussed above, it is far more likely that the Court issued it per curiam because it dealt with only a pretrial matter and involved some 530 documents out of the more than 55,000 pages produced.

In Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Renfrow, 130 S.W.3d 70, 72-73 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam), the Court held that driving a company truck to the house of the employee’s girlfriend, and then later some forty miles away to a night spot was a “material deviation from any implied permission he may have had to use the vehicle.” The facts aren’t even close here on the scope of the permission involved—hence the per curiam disposition.

In Dallas Metrocare Servs. v. Pratt, 124 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam), the Court again relied upon a previous, authored opinion’s holding that “mere incorporation of … [a] definition” from another statute “does not by itself manifest a clear legislative intent to waive immunity.” See Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2003).

In Speed Boat Leasing, Inc. v. Elmer, 124 S.W.3d 210, 213 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam), the Court referenced several prior, authored opinions each of which that held a common carrier is an entity whose “business … is public transportation,” but not one to whom “such transportation is ‘only incidental’ to its primary business.”

In Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 714-15 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam), the Court held that a series of contentious, callous, and unprofessional contacts by the petitioner regarding two commercial construction contracts– while reprehensible–was not so atrocious as to qualify as “extreme and outrageous.” This one involved a little more legal analysis and might have been a somewhat closer question than those discussed above, but was clearly not so outside so the purview of the Court as to be labeled an “inappropriate” use of a per curiam opinion.

In Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 728 nn.7, 8 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam), the Court relied upon a multitude of previous, authored opinions that plainly held “some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence,” and “an inference stacked only on other inferences is not legally sufficient evidence.” No great jurisprudential stretch that.

In In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 208-11 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam), the Court vacated a pretrial consolidation order after relying upon the diagnostic framework established by a previous, authored opinion. In re Ethyl, 975 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1998 ). Once again, a pretrial dispute, the merits of which were plainly governed by a prior, authored opinion.

In Walls Regional Hosp. v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam), the Court again relied upon several prior, authored opinions that established the record did not support the appellees’ contention that the conduct complained of originated and was then “transported into the place of employment from [their] private or domestic [lives],” or that the appellant intentionally injured the appellees.

As with many per curiam opinions, the Court in In Koch Ref. Co. v. Chapa, 11 S.W.3d 153, 156-57 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) appeared to have rejected the proposed application of a well established recovery doctrine to novel yet simple fact-pattern.

In In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam), the Court hardly stretched its jurisprudential limits by relying upon a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case and the seminal authority on contracts that the mere fact the real parties in interest possessed “no bargaining power or ability to change the contract terms” is not, in and of itself, legally “automatically unconscionable or void.” See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Security Pac. Corp., 961 F.2d 1148, 1154 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing 6A ARTHUR CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1376, at 20-21 (1962) & 7-9 (Supp. 1991)).

Finally, Texas Watch bemoans a per curiam opinion which is only six lines long. See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Stephens, 982 S.W.2d 370, 370 (Tex. 199 (pre curiam). Moreover, the opinion itself is an answer to a certified question from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and defers to the lengthy legal analysis contained in a Fifth Circuit dissent—hence it’s brevity (and per curiam nature).

That’s it, that’s the sum total of juristic outrage of which Texas Watch complains. While Texas Watch has every right–and to the extent that it may even be correct–to complain of the political effect of these decisions, Texas Watch’s ire is misdirected. The legal bases for these per curiam decisions are sound and entirely appropriate for per curiam disposition. Texas Watch would do far better to publicly harangue and chastise the true arbiters of the perceived misery against which Texas Watch rails—the Texas Legislature.

Just don’t masquerade as legal experts presenting a sober and thorough analysis of the Court’s recent per curiam practice seriously testing what may indeed turn out to be a fair thesis. Instead, Texas Watch has manifestly either been incapable of attracting or hiring a seasoned appellate expert to conduct such an analysis, or they have more likely just not bothered to even attempt such an endeavor. Neither motive is a fair or rational basis to impugn the professional integrity and legal acumen of those who have garnered the electoral support of a majority of the voters in our Great State.

Thx to Lefty

Not a member of MENSANot either

Criminal minds

Just when you thought the Adam “Bulletproof” Reposa saga couldn’t get any more convoluted and strange, it does.

Turns out that Reposa’s former law partner, Bruce Garrison–who I assumed severed ties with Reposa after Reposa was sentenced to ninety days in jail for contempt of court–may have been given the boot by Reposa instead.

Back in November of ’07, Garrison was charged with six felony counts of tampering with a government record and forgery relating to his alleged forging of several local judges’ signatures on bonds. Now, the best part, one of the judges whose signature Garrison forged was none other Benchslapper in Chief nominee Jan Breland.

That’s right, the same judge before whom Garrison’s former law partner later demonstrated the hand sign for “contempt of court.”

Small wonder she had little patience for Reposa’s antics in light of his former law partner’s demonstrated disregard for Judge Breland’s office. What is more, just days after Garrison was indicted for creatively obtaining judicial orders, he was indicted again for possessing marijuana, and possessing with the intent to deliver a controlled substance.

Apparently the two sets of indictments are related as described by one of the other judges whose signature Garrison forged:

Signing a judge’s name wouldn’t slow a drug addict down a bit[,] … [w]hen you have problems such as Mr. Garrison’s, you need money, and when you’re desperate for money, you’ll steal from your parents, you’ll steal from your friends, you’ll forge judge’s signatures on bonds.

Garrison’s illicit activities have resulted in the indefinite suspension of his law license by the Texas Bar. So, while it is still unclear how the two parted company, it is hard to fathom two lawyers more aptly suited to practice together.

Thx to Awesomeness for Awesome’s Sake, Tex Parte Blog, and KXAN

Not only that, how did U.T. Law ever admit–much less allow to graduate–this buffoon? The depth and breadth of Adam “Bulletproof” Reposa‘s idiocy is even greater than I feared.

* * * WARNING–NSFW language * * *

Can’t imagine why his former law partner, being “directed” by Reposa above, would have jumped at the chance to wind down the partnership once “jailbait” Reposa was thrown in the hoosegow.

Even more disturbing is a piece of evidence introduced at Reposa’s recent trial on contempt charges for making onanistic hand gestures in court. At the hearing, Assistant D.A. Randy Leavitt introduced a copy of a newspaper ad Professor Reposa actually ran here in Austin, entitled DWI Stud, which depicts him having sex with a woman dressed like a police officer and reads:

Check out Austin’s hottest DWI TAPES from cases where people were found NOT GUILTY. There are lots of DWI LAWYERS in town, but how many TAPES do they have? Who can put it down in the courtroom, and make them take it like he wants? BULLETPROOF, THE DWI STUD That’s who…You’d be a fool not to check out this man’s body of work. Watch him perform and then, you decide who you want.

If anyone had any question why his ninety-day sentence was more draconian than some might have expected, look no further than that ad.

Thx to Lowering the Bar and Awesomeness for Awesome’s Sake

No nonsense

Travis County Court at Law No. 6 Judge Jan Breland‘s benchslappery comes not from her pen but rather from her gavel by way of the penalty suffered by unctuous young attorneys who perform lewd hand gestures in her court.

Local criminal (no pun intended) defense attorney Adam “Bulletproof” Reposa (the “[b]ulletproof” part is the moniker Reposa assigned himself on his SBOT page) was sentenced to ninety days in jail today for his use of an onanistic hand gesture in court while opposing counsel, an assistant D.A., was explaining the terms of a proposed plea bargain to Judge Breland.

Not only will Reposa now get to spend some quality time with many of his former clients, he has apparently parted ways with his law partner, Bruce Garrison, who has removed Reposa from their formerly joint website.

While retired District Judge Paul Davis was the jurist who actually handed down today’s sentence (which, while still surprisingly severe, was only half of the statutorily-allowed maximum sentence of six months imprisonment, TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 21.002(b) (Vernon 2005)), the benchslapping credit for sanctioning Reposa in response to his self-gratificatory sign language in the first place rightly goes to Judge Breland.

* * * UPDATE * * *

D-bag

See “Bulletproof”‘s interview with the media immediately after he was sentenced. My favorite do-it-yourself quote:

I’m not very good at __________________.

What, “being a lawyer,” “not pissing off judges,” “staying out of jail,” “avoiding malpractice,” “dodging penological bullets?”

Thx to Judge Breland, the Statesman, KEYE, an anonymous Texas lawyer, and Above the Law